Federalism and political asymmetry: regional elections and political parties

Elections
As we noted in chapter 1, 'Competitive elections are one of the cornerstones of democracy. Without freely established political parties battling in honestly conducted elections, democracy by most definitions does not exist'.
1 Since the adoption of the Russian Constitution in December 1993 Russian citizens have been given the opportunity to engage in numerous rounds of national and local level election campaigns. There have now been three elections for the state Duma (1993, 1995 and 1999) , two presidential elections (1996 and 2000) and two or more rounds of elections for regional level legislative and executive bodies. Thus, for example, over the period 1995-98, elections took place for more than 5,000 deputies of regional legislative assemblies in almost all subjects of the federation and a further 14,000 deputies were elected to municipal bodies. 2 In addition, during this same period citizens cast their votes for 101 republican presidents and regional governors. Average turnout for the assembly elections was 42.8 per cent and for regional governors and presidents a healthy 55.6 per cent.
To a large degree these elections marked a watershed in centralperiphery relations and a recognition by the centre that the regions had to be granted a significant degree of economic and political autonomy within the federation. The higher status of the regional political bodies was also reflected in the fact that their two top leaders (chairs of assemblies and governors/presidents) were from 1996, granted ex officio membership of the Federal Council. More recently, Russian democracy has been further consolidated by a third round of regional elections conducted over the period 1999-2001.
Manipulation of the electoral system
However, the cynical nature in which President Yeltsin manipulated the election process in the regions has done much to damage the develop-ment of a democratic political culture. Yeltsin's victory over the parliamentarians signalled a victory of executive power over legislative power which eventually led to the development of a semi-authoritarian form of presidential power at the federal level and more overt forms of executive dominance at the regional level. In the wake of the dissolution of the Russian Parliament in October 1993, Yeltsin turned his wrath on regional officials, many of whom had sided with the parliament against the President. Yeltsin viewed the local soviets (assemblies) as the local headquarters of the Communist 'intransigent opposition', and he was anxious to see an end to their powers.
3 'The system of Soviets', he declared, 'displayed complete disregard for the security of the state and its citizens', and in so doing 'wrote the final chapter of their own political life'. 4 In presidential decrees promulgated in October 1993, Yeltsin called for the abolition of regional and local soviets (assemblies), which were to be replaced in new elections by much smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees whilst mandatory for the regions were only recommended for the republics. 5 The first terms of the new assemblies were to be elected for a period of just two years (as with the first session of the national parliament) and elections were to be conducted over the period December 1993 -March 1994 . The decrees also called for a sharp reduction in the number of deputies represented in the soviets, down from 250-300 to between 15 and 50 deputies. There was also a significant reduction in the number of deputies permitted to work on a full-time professional basis. This was legally restricted to two-fifths of the total number of deputies. And there was a return to the practice of the Soviet era with the right of deputies to combine their parliamentary duties with work in the executive bodies of state. Members of the regional administration and lower level executives from cities and district administrations could now also be elected deputies to the regional assemblies. In some cases these officials were directly appointed by the regional governors or presidents in republics (see chapter 9). 6 From the dissolution of the regional soviets in 1993 until the first new elections conducted over the period 1994-96 there was an absence of legislative power in many regions. Moreover, during this period, Yeltsin personally appointed the heads of regional executives and he posted presidential representatives to the regions (for a discussion of legislative-executive relations see chapter 7).
By May 1994 assembly elections had been successfully carried out in seventy regions of the Federation. But, as the terms of these first regional assemblies neared completion in 1995 and 1996, Yeltsin, fearing that the communist opposition would sweep the board, called for the elections to be postponed. Thus, in Presidential edicts of 17 September 1995 and 2 March 1996 7 he cynically prolonged the sessions of forty-two assemblies.
In one region, the elections were postponed until March 1997; in 31 regions until December 1997; and in four regions until as late as March 1998. Once again, this legislation did not apply to the ethnic republics which continued to elect their own presidents and to control the timing of elections to their assemblies. A number of regional assemblies were only too happy to have their powers prolonged, whilst in others appeals against the decrees were placed before the courts (e.g. Republic of Marii El, Kemerovo, Sakhalin, and Tula oblasts). However, the Constitutional Court not surprisingly gave its support to the President. More recently, since the popular election of regional governors, the dates of elections to regional assemblies (now normally every four or five years) have been decided at the local level either by the assemblies themselves, the electoral commissions or the governors (chief executives). As we shall discuss in chapter 9, chief executives, following Yeltsin's example, have blatantly used such powers to their own advantage.
Structure and tenure of legislatures
The vast majority of regional assemblies are elected for a period of four years. 8 In three regions (Volgograd, Vologda and Sverdlovsk) there is a rotation of half of the deputies every two years. In the majority of subjects there are single chamber assemblies. Only the republics of Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkariya, Kareliya, Sakha and Sverdlovsk Oblast have bicameral legislatures. Not surprisingly with such wide variations in the size and population of federal subjects there are also considerable variations in the number of deputies elected to local assemblies. Whilst the norm is somewhere between twenty and fifty for oblast assemblies, there are less than twenty deputies in the sparsely populated autonomous okrugs of Ust-Orda Buryatiya, Aginsk Buryat, Komi-Perm, Nenetsk, Chukota, Koryak and Taimyr. In order to increase their status a number of regions have created multi-member electoral districts. In the ethnic republics, which have no restrictions placed on the size of their assemblies, we find much larger assemblies, many with 100 or more deputies. Thus for example: Bashkortostan (190); Tatarstan (130); Dagestan (121); Udmurtiya (100); and Khakasiya (100). Russia's constitutional asymmetry is reflected in the rather absurd situation whereby Moscow city with a population of over 8 million has 35 deputies in its assembly, whilst the Republic of Altai, with a population of just over 200,000, has 50 deputies. 9 As noted above, legislation limits the number of deputies that may work full time. Only in three of the single chamber assemblies -Moscow (35 deputies), St Petersburg (50) , and the Koryak autonomous okrug (with just 12 deputies) -do all the deputies work on a professional basis. This is also the case in one of the two chambers in Bashkortostan, KabardinoBalkariya, Sakha and Sverdlovsk. In Bashkortostan, just 30 out of 144 deputies work full time. All of the full time deputies are members of the legislative chamber, whilst the Chamber of Representatives is reserved for the part time deputies. In Tatarstan just 28 of its 130 deputies are full time professional politicians. In Tatarstan there are two kinds of plenary session; those which include all deputies (full and part time) and those which are restricted to the much smaller group of full time deputies. There is also a list of key issues which can only be decided in those sessions where there is a full complement of deputies. 10 In some assemblies only a very small per centage of the deputies work full time. Thus, for example, in Kursk, of the 45 deputies only 3 are full time professional deputies, the oblast chair, deputy chair and secretary. The large number of part time deputies, many of whom are employed in district administrations (see chapter 7) has undoubtedly weakened the authority and independence of regional assemblies.
Elections for governors
Yeltsin's control over the appointment of governors lasted much longer than that over regional assemblies. Decrees adopted in November 1991, October 1994 and September 1995 placed moratoriums on gubernatorial elections. The September 1995 decree which postponed elections until 1996 was challenged in the courts by the state Duma and a number of regional assemblies. But, in April 1996 the court finally resolved that the decree was consistent with the Constitution.
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Gubernatorial elections finally got underway in earnest only in the period August 1995-April 1997 when there was a total of 70 elections (for which 88 million people registered). By early 1999 almost all of Russia's 89 chief executives had come to power through the ballot box. 12 The majority of executive bodies are elected for a period of four years. 13 In the 1995-97 elections there was an average of five candidates standing for each executive post, although in some ethnic republics there was a throwback to the old Soviet system with just one candidate standing unopposed (see chapter 9). In approximately one-third of these elections, candidates could win with just a plurality of the votes, whereas in two-thirds of the regions, over 50 per cent of the vote was required for victory otherwise there had to be run off elections between the two top candidates. Run-offs took place in 30 per cent of the regions. 14 The elections armed the governors with a new democratic legitimacy and greatly enhanced their authority and status in the regions. No longer could they be appointed or dismissed on the whim of the President. The elections also brought to power new representatives of the communist and nationalist opposition, and other independents ('strong managers').
They also brought new opponents of the President to the Federation Council and weakened Yeltsin's overall control over the upper chamber. In a further round of gubernatorial elections conducted over the period 2000-1, fifty-three chief executives were elected (see below).
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Political parties and democracy
Whilst there is some debate about the importance of parties in contemporary industrial societies most scholars would still agree with Geoffrey Pridham that parties and party systems must remain a basic if not the central theme for examining not only the quality of the liberal democracy in question but also its progress towards and achievement of democratic consolidation. 16 As Juan J. Linz notes, 'Today, in all countries of the world, there is no alternative to political parties in the establishment of democracy. No form of non-party representation that has been advocated has ever produced democratic government'. 17 And Peter Mair adds that, 'However fragmented, weak, or undisciplined, however poorly rooted in society, however unstable and vociferous, parties are a very real and necessary part of the politics of new democracies. Democracy cannot be sustained without competing political parties '. 18 Parties are particularly important during regime transitions and the consolidation of democracy where they play a vital role in bolstering system legitimacy at a time of political uncertainty. 19 And strong and cohesive national parties have an important integrative function in federal states binding together the diverse subjects of the federation.
According to Hague, Harrop and Breslin, parties perform four vital functions in modern democracies: 1) as agents of elite recruitment they serve as the major mechanism for preparing and recruiting candidates for public office, 2) as agents of interest aggregation they transform a multitude of specific demands into more manageable packages of proposals . . . 3) Parties serve as a point of reference for many supporters and voters, giving people a key to interpreting a complicated political world and 4) the modern party offers direction to government, performing the vital task of steering the ship of state. 20 Scholars in the field have traditionally been divided over which prerequisites are necessary for the creation of a strong party system. One group stresses the external environment in which parties operate -the political culture and the strength of civil society. From this perspective, parties are seen as dependent variables and their ability to develop successfully is determined by these external cultural factors. As Karen Dawisha notes: 'a strong civil society is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a strong party and system and it is difficult to find examples where parties have been established in states with weak civil cultures'. 21 In contrast, a second group of scholars focus on the internal structures, leadership and operational behaviour of parties. In this second approach, parties are seen as independent variables whose actions can positively or negatively shape civil society and culture. Here, institutions matterchange the institutions, change the culture. Strong cohesive parties can bring about consolidated democracies even in hostile cultural environments. Democratic parties can create democrats. But just as equally, weakly institutionalised parties and party systems can allow authoritarianism to take root. Hence, before parties can play their vital role in the process of consolidating democracy, parties themselves must be institutionalised and consolidated.
According to Scott Mainwaring, institutionalisation 'means the process by which a practice or organisation becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted'. 22 Strongly institutionalised parties exhibit the following characteristics: '1) high degrees of stability of interparty competition and low electoral volatility; 2) strong roots in society; 3) they possess unassailable support and legitimacy from elites and citizenry; 4) they have strong, disciplined and territorially comprehensive organisations with well established structures and procedures; 5) significant material and human resources; and 6) an independent status not overshadowed by a personalistic leader or coterie'. 23 Mainwaring contrasts the highly institutionalised parties largely to be found in western Europe and North America with the weakly institutionalised 'inchoate' parties of the 'third wave democracies' in eastern Europe and Russia.
Party representation in regional assemblies
There has already been a significant body of work devoted to the study of parties in Russia at the national level 24 but very little has, as yet, been published on the development of parties at the regional level. 25 Here, we focus on the participation of 'national' parties 26 in elections for regional assemblies and governors. In contrast to previous studies, based on a small sample of case studies, I provide a macro-level analysis covering all eighty-nine of Russia's regions. In addition to the study of national parties in elections at the regional level we also examine the territorial comprehensiveness of national parties as indicated by their participation in the December 1999 elections to the state Duma.
Whilst there has been some progress in the consolidation and solidification of political parties at the national level, the development of parties and their participation in regional level politics, if anything, has declined since 1995. All six of Mainwaring's factors of institutionalisation are still very weak and undeveloped in Russia.
There has been a proliferation of parties and political movements in Russia. Over the period 1991-97 a total of 5,000 parties and 60,000 public organisations were registered with the Ministry of Justice. 27 However, the vast majority of elections for regional assemblies and executive bodies have been, and continue to be, largely partyless. And although, some progress in party activism could be detected over the two election cycles of 1993-94 and 1995-97, it has declined precipitously in the recent round of elections which were held in 2000-1 (see table 6 30 (see appendix 6.1). But no single party held a majority of the seats in any of Russia's 89 regional assemblies, and there were only 10 chairs of assemblies with a party affiliation. 31 It is only in the regions of the so called 'red belt' (e.g., Stavropol¢ Krai, Belgorod, Vologda, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov, Bryansk and Penza oblasts), where we see higher levels of party saturation of assemblies. Here, the communists have been able to achieve a plurality, if not a majority of assembly seats, in coalition with other parties and blocks, such as the Agrarian Party of Russia and the National Patriotic Union of Russia. I can find no comparable data on party representation for 2001, but the situation, if anything, must be worse than in 1998. I would expect that currently there will be an even smaller number of assemblies where party members make up a plurality or a majority of the legislature. It is also important to note that these figures for party membership refer to figures for the umbrella term 'electoral associations' which include not only parties, but a host of other 'political movements' and civic organisations, many of which should more precisely be classified as interest, or occupational groups. Thus, under this rubric we find, for example, such groups as; the 'Union of Young Jurists' (Penza oblast), the 'Capital Housing Movement', and 'Medics for the Rebirth of Health' (Moscow city), the 'Fund for the Mentally Ill' (Saratov oblast), and even the football club 'Salyut' (Saratov oblast), and what appears to be a contradiction in terms, the 'Bloc of Non-Party Independents' (Krasnoyarsk krai). Also we need to take into account the fact that, in a number of regions, party representation will most likely be higher than the officially declared results, as candidates often deliberately fail to declare their party affiliation during the elections, only to emerge as members of party factions in the first session of the newly elected assemblies. Such concealment of one's party affiliation shows that for most candidates party membership continues to be seen as more of a liability than an asset.
The political orientation of legislative assemblies in 1998
Of the 635 deputies with a party affiliation in January 1998 32 by far the largest number belonged to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) (279 deputies or 44.0 per cent) which won seats in 42 regions. However, overall the Communist's 279 seats made up only 8.0 per cent of the total (see table 6 .2).
All of the other political parties had a minimal presence, none comprising even as much as 1 per cent of the total number of deputies. Thus, for example the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) won a mere 28 seats in 7 assemblies, the National Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR), 26 seats in three assemblies, Yabloko, 22 seats in 8 assemblies; Our Home is Russia (NDR), 18 seats in 12 assemblies, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 15 seats in just 6 assemblies.
Party affiliation in gubernatorial elections
If, as we have demonstrated above, party affiliation in regional assemblies was weak, in the governors' corps it has been even more inchoate and transient. Thus, for example, of the 4,000 public associations which had the right to nominate candidates in gubernatorial elections over the period 1995-97, only 100 (or 2.5 per cent) actually participated in just 48 regions. 33 And these public associations put forward just 18.8 per cent of the total number of candidates. Finally, of the 70 chief executives who were finally elected, just 10 (14.3 per cent) had a party affiliation. 34 The majority of regional governors and republican presidents have, for the most part, rejected any party affiliation or allegiance to a particular ideology, tending to portray themselves as strong pragmatic 'economic managers' whose deep concern for the welfare of their regions transcends party politics.
As Petrov and Titov note, of the 154 candidates in the 1995-97 gubernatorial elections, two-thirds lacked any political affiliation. And of the 57 candidates which did declare a political affiliation, 36 were communists, 18 liberal reformers, and there were 3 nationalists. 36 of the 70 incumbent governors won re-election. As table 6.3 shows, leaders of parties, political movements and public organisations made up only 5.3 per cent of the candidates and they won only 2.9 per cent of the posts. Leaders of economic 
The new governors' parties
Rather than governors joining parties in order to promote their election prospects, it is more often the case that parties are forced to turn to governors to help them bring home the regional votes. Regional presidents and governors have considerable control over electoral finances, the local media, courts and electoral commissions. There are many instances of governors resorting to outright manipulation of the electoral rules to ensure their victory in gubernatorial elections or to pack regional assemblies with their own appointed officials (we discuss these points in chapter 9).
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A new and worrying development is the creation of a number of governors' parties which were first created in the run-up to the 1999 Duma elections. The creation of these artificial top-down 'parties of government' have been a major blow to the development of grassroots democracy in the regions. As Slider notes, these governors' blocs were in effect, 'antiparty parties' set up specifically to preclude effective national party building in the regions. 38 These 'parties' (for example, Fatherland, All-Russia, Voice of Russia) were set up by regional governors to promote their own personal interests and the interests of their regions in the Duma. Table 6 .4 shows variations in the level of governors' support for parties in 1999. However, as noted above, we must be careful to take such declarations of party allegiance with a strong pinch of salt.
Elections for chief executives, 2000-1
As Corwin notes, the results of the 2000 gubernatorial elections shows that, 'incumbency bestows best advantage, while party identification . . . means little'. 39 Thus, for example, in 60 elections which were held over the period December 1999 to January 2001, incumbents won 68 per cent of the seats. This was a much better result than in 1995-97 where just over 
Factors explaining Russia's weakly institutionalised party system
How can we explain the chronically low levels of party activism and representation demonstrated in the data above? I would argue that the following six factors have thwarted the institutionalisation of political parties in Russia; (1) the legacy of an authoritarian political culture, (2) the weak development of social and economic cleavages, (3) the negative impact of Russia's presidential system, (4) the choice of electoral systems, (5) Russia's weak asymmetrical form of federalism, and (6) the power of regional governors and republican presidents to thwart the development of parties in their territories and to control the electoral process.
The legacy of an authoritarian political culture Seventy years of communist rule have left an authoritarian legacy, a very weak and inchoate civil society and massive citizen distrust in political institutions. 41 As President Putin notes, 'The roots of many of our failures lies in the underdevelopment of civil society and the authorities' inability to communicate and work together with it . . . Only the scaffolding of a civil society has been built in Russia'. 42 A legal framework for political parties has only recently been developed and up until 2001 there was no law on parties, their judicial status, or financing. Laws on elections, as we have noted, speak of 'electoral associations' and 'blocks' among which there are 'parties', 'political movements' and 'political associations'.
Moreover, political parties still command very little trust in Russian society. In a VTsIOM survey of public opinion, carried out in March 1999, only 3 per cent of respondents declared full confidence in parties. 43 The weak development of social and economic cleavages As McFaul notes, 'Whereas most countries in transition seek to change only their system of governance, Russia had to create a new state, a new political system, and a new economic system simultaneously'. 44 But which reforms should be implemented first? Linz and Stepan have argued that political reform should come first 'because democracy legitimates the market, not the reverse'. 45 However, without comparable economic reforms accompanying political change, transitional states cannot generate the necessary social cleavages around which parties need to coalesce and compete for power. As Smolar observes, 'in state socialist societies, the typical citizen identified with only two levels of community, one was family and friends, and the other was the nation. Identification with any intermediate structures was lacking altogether. In addition, the proletarianisation of these societies made it difficult for individuals to recognize differences of interests'. 46 In the first years of Russia's transition the implementation of political reforms far outpaced the development of economic reforms. This has led to a situation whereby we have seen the formation of a multitude of parties with very shallow roots in civil society. Thus, for example we have witnessed a proliferation of right of centre parties which were founded long before there was any sizeable property owning bourgeoisie to support them. Where sharp cleavages did emerge they were much more likely to be based on ethnic and regional conflicts rather than economics and class.
The lack of well developed social cleavages has meant that Russian parties are more often based around personalities than policies. Many parties in post-communist states are classic 'insider parties' formed from loose coalitions of deputies in the national parliament or they are topdown elite organizations with no real grassroots support (for example, the 'parties of power'). Not surprisingly, party identification is extremely low in Russia. As Stephen White notes, according to survey evidence, just 22 per cent of Russians identified to some degree with a political party, compared with 87 per cent of the electorate of the United States and more than 92 per cent in the United Kingdom. 47 And electoral volatility in Russia is, according to Matthew Wyman six times higher than in western Europe and twice as high as in eastern Europe. 48 It is estimated that just 0.5 per cent of the population are actually members of political parties compared to about 4-5 per cent in Europe.
Party cohesion is much more difficult to achieve in presidential systems than in parliamentary regimes For Ryabov, Russia's 'super-presidential republic' with a 'legislature highly limited in power and functions' has been extremely detrimental to the development of a viable party system in Russia. In such conditions, parties do not vie for power at either the federal or regional level. With the exception of the KPRF and Yabloko, parties do not put forth their own candidates for the presidency of Russia or the governorship of the regions; in the best case they join various pre-election coalitions and backing groups, where the decisive role is played not by parties, but by other often non-institutionalised support groups. 49 As Dawisha writes: 'Presidentialism by focusing on the election of a single individual to an all powerful post, diminishes the influence of the party system'. In contrast, 'parliamentary systems require the formation of disciplined parties and coalitions in order to keep the executive in power' (see chapter 7). 50 And as Golosov notes: 'Presidentialism has an negative impact on the development of political parties for in order to win the Presidency parties are forced to abandon any ideological orientations in order to try and win votes from as wide a constituency as possible'. 51 Legislative stalemate and deadlock are also much more common in presidential systems. In Russia, such stalemate turned to outright hostilities between the parliament and the president, and ultimately to the forced dissolution of the White House in September 1993. Moreover, Yeltsin's claim to 'stand above party' hindered the consolidation of parties at the national level. It has clearly not been in the interest of Yeltsin or Putin to support the development of strong disciplined parties which could rise up and challenge their authority -a divided and fragmented parliament is a weak parliament.
Russia's choice of electoral system As Lijphart observes, electoral systems are 'strong instruments for shaping party systems and (through those party systems) cabinets, executive-legislative relations'. 52 For Sartori electoral systems have two goals:
One is representative justice that is, fair and equal representation. The other is governing capability. There is a trade-off between the advantages of proportional representation and those of majoritarian electoral laws.
Proportional-representation systems tend to maximize representation, while majoritarian ones maximize governability. 53 In majoritarian systems we usually find two-party systems whilst in systems based on proportional representation we see multiparty systems and multiparty coalitions. Different electoral systems also benefit certain groups. Thus for example, 'First past the post systems tend to favour the incumbent powers whilst proportional representation systems allow for a more diverse set of representation'. 54 In Russia the role of parties at the national level has matured over the three elections of 1993/95/99 helped undoubtedly by the fact that half the members of the state Duma are elected according to proportional representation using a party list system. 55 However, the maturation of parties at the regional level has been less impressive. Here the first past the post system in single-member districts is the most common system in operation. 56 However, across the federation there are various types of multimandate constituencies which may be formed according to territorial, administrative-territorial, national, or national-territorial criteria. 57 The effect of the electoral system on party building in Russia's regions is borne out by the data on party saturation which is much higher in those assemblies which are elected according to some form of proportionality (data for 1995-97 election cycle); Krasnoyarsk Krai (80 per cent), Kaliningrad Oblast (34 per cent), Koryak AO (44 per cent), Ust¢-Orda Buryatiya AO (21 per cent). And all of the 28 seats in the lower chamber of Sverdlovsk Oblast which are elected (half each two years) by party list. In Sverdlovsk, in contrast to most other regions the assembly is dominated by regional rather than federal parties but as we discuss below this will radically change once the new law on parties comes into operation.
The introduction of a party list system throughout the federation would undoubtedly increase party representation in the assemblies, but this change is clearly not in the interests of the incumbent governors (and economic elites) who have benefited from fragmented, weak, and partyless assemblies and the absence of a parliamentary opposition. Nonetheless, the Central Electoral Commission is currently considering new proposals to introduce party lists in the regions. If these reforms are implemented, half of the seats in regional assemblies will in the future be reserved for party members. 58 Russian federalism has impacted negatively on the development of national parties Russia's highly asymmetrical federalism has made it very difficult for parties to create strong unified structures, and party fragmentation has in turn intensified regional divisions within the state. Only the communist party can be said to have anything approaching a coherent national party structure and party discipline is also very low or non-existent. Through-out the federation we can also witness a bewildering array of electoral coalitions with different regional branches of the same federal party striking up agreements with different parties in different regions and putting forward a plethora of differing party platforms.
Russia's adoption of nationally drafted party lists in a single nationwide electoral district rather than regionally drafted lists in multi-member districts (as is the case in Germany), has also worked against the development of strong nationally integrated parties. As Remington notes, the choice of one single nation-wide electoral district rather than a larger number of multimember districts, was a deliberate one, 'designed to reduce the chances that parties with a strong regional or ethnic appeal might win seats and weaken the state's unity'. 59 However, some element of federalism has now been built into the electoral system. There are two types of party list for Duma elections, an all-Union federal list with a maximum of eighteen candidates, and a second regional list of candidates. 60 Some degree of party centralisation is also essential for parties to operate effectively in a federation. Centralised parties can help bind the members of a federation together, whilst, on the contrary, weak federalised parties can exacerbate ethnic problems in multinational federations. Thus, as Burgess argues, where there is symmetry, 'between the federal government and the constituent units we can expect the relative partisan harmony to have a binding impact upon the federation'. However, where there is asymmetry, 'the resulting differences of interest may have a centrifugal effect' which may ultimately 'lead to pressures for secession from the union'. 61 The importance of national parties which cross ethnic and regional divisions is also vital in multinational federations. As David Laitin notes: National parties that seek to build alliances that crosscut cultural groups in all regions tend to modulate the demands from regionally based autonomy movements. In Nigeria, the constitutional drafters recognised this issue and required that to become accredited parties must have significant membership across a variety of regions. 62 But, not one single party in Russia has branches in all federal subjects. And, none of the parties have been able to compete in all electoral districts. As table 6.5 shows, in the 1999 elections for the Duma even the KPRF could only field candidates in 62.2 per cent of the single member election districts. Yabloko and NDR fielded candidates in 50-60 per cent; OVR and SPS in half, and Yedinstvo ('Unity') in just 18 per cent. 63 Zhirinovsky's block failed to contest a single seat. 64 Turning to the party list elections, even here, none of the parties fielded candidates in all of the regions; NDR's candidates competed in 84 of Russia's 89 regions; the KPRF (84 regions), OVR (68) , SPS (63) , Yabloko (57) and Yedinstvo (53) . 65 The weak organisational base of national parties in the regions is also revealed by the stark fact that a significant number of the candidates registered for election, even in the party lists (PL), are not actually members of these parties. LDPR had the highest per centage of its own party members on its party list (92.6 per cent), followed by the KPRF (78 per cent), Yabloko (73.2 per cent), OVR (62.1 per cent), SPS (49.4 per cent). The former 'party of power' NDR, had an incredibly low figure of only 3.1 per cent 66 (see table 6 .5 which also shows similar wide variations in the single member lists (SM)). And, when it comes to choosing candidates for national elections we find very poor representation of party members from the regions. Thus, for example, approximately one third of all candidates nominated by national parties for the 1999 Duma elections came from elites residing in the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg (see table 6 .5).
The weak political affiliation of regional governors, and chairs of regional assemblies, is also important for party consolidation in the Federation Council where these two groups (up until January 2002 were ex officio members). In a vicious circle, weak levels of party affiliation at the regional level feed into weak party consolidation at the national level and vice versa.
The role of governors and presidents in thwarting the development of parties in the regions
Finally, it is clearly not in the interests of most regional governors and presidents to support the development of parties in their regions. A partyless assembly is a weak assembly. As we discuss in chapter 9 many regional executives have been able to hold on to power by manipulating the electoral process, squeezing out opposition candidates, and blocking the development of parties.
The June 2001 Law on Political Parties
The new 'Law on Political Parties' which was ratified by the Duma in June 2001 does address some of the issues and problems of party building, discussed above. According to this law, which comes into operation in 2003, before a party can be registered it must have a minimum 10,000 members spread across 'more than half of the subjects of the Russian Federation' (article 3.2) with a minimum of 100 members in each regional branch. And when the law comes into force 'political blocks' and 'electoral associations' will be prohibited. Those parties which are registered will be funded by the state. Thus, any party which collects more than 3 per cent of the total vote in parliamentary elections will receive 0.2 roubles from the Federal Budget for each vote cast in its favour. The Chair of the Central Electoral Commission, Aleksandr Veshnyakov, has predicted that the law will have the positive effect of reducing the number of parties and movements from the current 200 to 10-30. 68 Other politicians are not so optimistic. Vladimir Lysenko (head of the Republic Party) argues that the new legislation will disproportionately benefit the two largest parties, the Communist Party, and Yedinstvo, 'transforming the multi-party system into a system of only a few parties'. 69 According to Lysenko, the new law will make it impossible for any of the other parties to recruit the necessary number of new members in the time permitted. Furthermore, the law strikes a blow against local democracy in the regions as it bans regional parties from forming and competing in elections. As a consequence, Lysenko argues: 'The provinces will inevitably be removed from politics on all levels, and all decisions will be made in and by the centre alone. It means reverting to a unitary state, a loss of one of the major achievements of the past decade -the federal structure of the state'. 70 Financial and other bureaucratic controls from the centre over the parties will also prohibit the development of a 'strong and constructive opposition', without which, as Lysenko argues, 'any state is doomed to stagnation and authoritarianism'. 71 Moreover, the law makes it relatively easy for the government to suspend the activity of a party or to shut it down for good. Finally, the 'law does not allow the party system to evolve naturally'. Instead, it is the state which is 'to decide what kinds of parties Russia requires and which ones it can do without, and what kind of party system Russia needs'. 
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Conclusions
The problem of party building in Russia's regions comes not so much from what Sartori calls 'polarized pluralism' or the danger of 'anti-system parties' threatening the stability of the party system. Russia's problem is that, with the exception of the KPRF, and the transient 'parties of power' (Russia's Choice, Our Home is Russia, Yedinstvo), there are no other national parties with sufficient organisational capacity and financial resources to compete effectively in federal wide elections. Thus, one of the striking features of local politics in Russia is the almost total partyless nature of regional election campaigns and the dismal representation of political parties in regional assemblies. Politics at the regional level is highly fragmented. In the majority of cases, competition is not between disciplined nationwide parties with competing policies but rather between a host of competing individuals and personalities. If you are a communist candidate in the 'red belt' this may very well be an advantage, but in most other regions a party label is more liable to scare away potential voters. The absence of strong institutionalised parties in the regions has intensified the clientalistic and corporatist nature of politics in Russia. As we discuss in the next chapter state officials and economic elites have benefited from the partyless nature of regional politics and the fragmented and divided nature of politics in the assemblies. As Liebert notes: 'empirical studies on Third World legislatures . . . have pointed out that legislatures are far more vulnerable to extra-constitutional attacks against their prerogatives in systems where political parties are weak; stronger parties help the legislature to generate the support it needs from mass publics to withstand challenges from bureaucratic elites'. 73 Populist regional governors have tapped into the vacuum of power in Russia's partyless regions, creating regional autocracies. As Mainwaring observes: 'The weakness of parties' social roots means that democratic political competition, rather than being channelled through parties and other democratic institutions, assumes a personalized character . . . populism and "antipolitics" are more common in countries with weak institutionalised systems'. 74 However, fragmented and divided assemblies have also led to legislative deadlock. Governors often cannot guarantee majority support for their policies and often they are forced to enter into a 'war of laws' with the regional assemblies. Just as Yeltsin found himself caught in a deadly stalemate with the Russian parliament in 1993 so republican presidents and regional governors (mini-presidencies) have found themselves in similar predicaments (see chapter 7).
In recent years we have also seen the worrying development of governors' parties, created from above, thwarting the development of grassroots parties, from below. As the centrifugal power of the regions have expanded, the need for strong unifying parties has become more pressing. Yet as Alfred Stepan observes, 'No other federal system has a party system that to date has contributed so little to producing polity wide programmatic discipline'. 75 It is very difficult to consolidate parties in weak and fragmented federal systems, but it is even more difficult to build federal systems in the absence of strong and territorially comprehensive parties. The new law on political parties has gone some way to try and reduce the number of parties competing at the national level by demanding that in order to register they must have a minimum number of members, with representation in at least half of Russia's federal subjects. However, as we noted, the law also prohibits the development of regional parties and it has a number of other negative features. In conclusion, there can be no consolidation of democracy in Russia without a nationwide consolidation of parties and the party system. The future prospects for the development of a multi-party democracy in Russia, both at the national and local levels, looks even bleaker under Putin than it did under Yeltsin. 
